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A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING 
SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS: 
GAPS, RELEVANCE AND INTEGRATED 
EVIDENCE 
Carl F. Cranor, Ph.D., M.S.L.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding Daubert v. 
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals and related cases,1 overturned the 
Frye rule for assessing expert testimony2 and heightened judges’ 
duties to review expert testimony, including scientific testimony 
in toxic tort cases. This job may have turned out to be more 
                                                          
  * Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside. 
M.S.L., 1981 Yale Law School; Ph.D. 1971, University of California, Los 
Angeles; B.A. 1966, Mathematics, University of Colorado. I want to thank 
Margaret Berger for the opportunity to discuss these issues at the Science for 
Judges Program at Brooklyn Law School March 3-4, 2006. 
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); 
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
2 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test required 
that the generic kinds of studies, tests or techniques on which an expert might 
rest testimony must be “generally accepted in the pertinent field.” Id. at 104. 
Specifically it noted that, “Just when a scientific principle or discovery 
crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult 
to define. Id. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in 
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific 
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.” Id. 
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difficult than the justices envisioned because one hurdle facing 
experts is the nature of scientific (or nondeductive) arguments 
themselves. The structure of nondeductive inferences, despite 
common use of them in our daily lives and their pervasive use in 
science and other technical areas, may not be fully appreciated 
because of the complex relationship between premises and 
conclusion and the substantive expertise needed to assess the 
arguments. 
Section I of this article discusses the amount of data known 
about some chemicals currently in commerce and how this 
profoundly affects information that experts have at their 
disposal, likely increasing the complexity of the arguments they 
can offer in support of legal claims. Section II of this article 
describes nondeductive (and scientific) inferences. Section III 
then focuses on three specific problems that pose particular 
challenges for courts: gaps in the arguments, scientific relevance 
of information, and the need to assess arguments based on all 
the integrated relevant evidence.3 Scientific testimony must 
utilize scientific arguments. These are nondeductive inferences, 
widely utilized, but perhaps under-appreciated. Nondeductive 
arguments, even the best of them, will have gaps that courts will 
need to recognize but not overreact to. A reviewing body needs 
to permit an expert’s testimony to rely on all the scientifically 
relevant information he or she utilizes in his or her arguments. 
The arguments must then be assessed by considering all the 
scientifically relevant evidence taken together on which the 
argument is based (not rejecting each piece of evidence); 
otherwise the review would not be a scientifically fair 
evaluation. Proper understanding of scientific arguments 
suggests that some courts have not fairly reviewed them as 
Daubert mandates. Lastly, Section IV will sketch how scientists 
would assess such arguments and then suggest a procedure 
courts might follow to mimic this for legal admissibility. 
                                                          
3 This Article does not seek to undertake a comprehensive discussion of 
the numerous issues concerning such arguments. 
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I. IGNORANCE ABOUT THE CHEMICAL UNIVERSE 
Chemical substances are quite often the objects of toxic tort 
suits, but regrettably little is known about them. This is a 
substantial barrier for those who might have been harmed by 
exposure to a toxic chemical. Moreover, it also greatly burdens 
experts who testify about such exposures because they are often 
forced to assemble disparate kinds of evidence that is both 
scientifically relevant and sufficiently good to come to 
conclusions about the toxicity of products. This may pose 
reviewing difficulties for judges and others who are not 
intellectually close to scientific arguments because such 
arguments are complex. 
In 1984 there were between 65,000 and 100,000 chemicals 
registered for use in commerce. At that time little was 
understood about their toxicity properties. The National 
Academy of Sciences found that for 78 percent of the 3,000 top-
volume chemicals in commerce, the most basic toxicity results 
could not be found in the public record.4 The Academy’s 
findings with regard to particular groups of registered chemicals 
were equally disturbing. The Academy found: 
 12,860 substances produced in excess of one million 
lbs/year, but 78 percent had no toxicity data at all; 
 13,911 chemicals produced in less than one million 
lbs/year (76 percent had no toxicity data); 
 21,752 substances whose production volume was 
unknown (82 percent had no toxicity data); 
 8,627 food additives (46 percent had no toxicity 
data);* 
 1,815 drugs (25 percent no toxicity data);* 
 3,410 cosmetic (56 percent had no toxicity data); and 
 3,350 pesticides (36 percent had no toxicity data).5 
                                                          
4 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING 84 (1984). 
5 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
SCREENING AND TESTING CHEMICALS IN COMMERCE 1 (1995). If derivatives 
and metabolites are included, some experts suggest that the more appropriate 
number is 100,000. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING 84 
(1984). Categories of substances marked with an asterisk (*) are currently 
CRANOR_2 3/3/2007  12:57 AM 
10 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Although this data is 20 years old, there is additional current 
evidence. In the early 1990s NRC Committee members, in 
response to being asked whether the report should be updated, 
found that there was insufficient change in the data to justify 
revisiting the 1984 findings.6 As recently as 1997, 75 percent of 
the 3,000 chemicals produced in the highest volumes still lacked 
basic toxicity data in the public record.7 This point about the 
scientific ignorance of substances should neither be 
overemphasized nor underemphasized. Although many 
substances have been created, some of them likely have not been 
pursued.8 Others will be industrial intermediates without 
significant human exposures and some may be sufficiently large 
molecules that they are not likely to pose toxicity problems 
(although they may not be wholly risk free).9 Nonetheless, there 
are a sufficiently large number of products in the market where 
there is likely to be public and workforce exposure that citizens 
should not rest easy. Wide anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
public believes that products to which they are exposed are 
legally required to be tested before they enter the market and 
perhaps that scientists know as much about most substances as 
they do about pharmaceutical products.10 However, as the data 
shows, this suggestion is clearly mistaken. 
Lack of scientific knowledge about the chemical universe 
will complicate judicial review of testimony in toxic tort cases. 
                                                          
subject to premarket testing and approval. This probably accounts for 
somewhat greater knowledge about them. James Huff & David Hoel, 
Perspective and Overview of the Concepts and Value of Hazard Identification 
as the Initial Phase of Risk Assessment for Cancer and Human Health, 18 
SCAN. J. WORK ENVIRON HEALTH 83, 85 (1992) (estimating that 50,000-
100,000 exist chemicals in the marketplace). 
6 John C. Bailor & Eula Bingham, personal communication, Annual 
Meetings of the Collegium Ramazzini, (2002). 
7 See DAVID ROE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC 
IGNORANCE 7 (1997). 
8 See Huff & Hoel, supra note 5. 
9 Id. 
10 This is a common view expressed by students in my classes and by 
audiences to whom I give presentations. 
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Experts likely will be forced to rely upon less than ideal 
information to make inferences about whether exposure to a 
substance can and did cause harm, because for any randomly 
chosen substance there is probably poor toxicity data. In 
particular, there will most likely be a shortage of good human 
data, because, for a variety of reasons, human data will be 
unavailable.11 This predicament forces scientists to infer any 
toxicity properties of products based on more complex 
evidentiary patterns such as animal evidence, chemical structure-
biological activity evidence, mutagenicity studies,12 molecular 
evidence and so on.13 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS 
More complex patterns of evidence present increasing 
challenges to reviewing scientific testimony because the kinds of 
evidence and how they are combined in scientific arguments are 
less familiar to those not steeped in the science. Nonetheless, 
courts need to be prepared for the task because even complex 
arguments can be quite good. In order to carry out their 
gatekeeping duties and be fair to both sides of the bar, judges 
will need to be able to understand the major outlines of such 
arguments. In addition, scientific arguments pose their own 
                                                          
11 In particular, human evidence is likely to be missing for many 
substances because often they have not been studied and human 
epidemiological studies tend to be insensitive, See Huff & Hoel, supra note 5 
(Table 2) and supra Section I. 
12 Mutagency has been described as: 
[t]he induction of mutations is due primarily to chemical or 
physical aterations in the structure of DNA that result in 
inaccurate replication of that region of the genome. The process 
of mutagenesis consists of structural DNA alternation, cell 
proliferation that fixes the DNA damage, and DNA repair that 
either directly repairs the alkylated base or bases or results in 
removal of larger segments of the DNA. 
Henry C. Pitot III & Yvonne P. Dragan, Chemical Carcinogenesis, in 
CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 6th ed., 86 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 
McGraw-Hill 2001) at 241-319, esp. at 256. 
13 See discussion infra at notes 148-61. 
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difficulties. 
Providing a causal explanation of an event is a matter of 
inference and of argument. How does one infer the best 
explanation of an event? Providing a philosophic account of 
causal explanation is difficult enough on its own terms; some 
philosophers emphasize the idea of making inferences to the best 
explanation,14 some are Bayesians,15 and so on.16 This Section 
will identify some of the major steps in inferences that are 
common to the different approaches by which scientists come to 
conclusions about the causal effects of exposures to substances. 
The aim is to provide a sufficiently accurate overview of 
nondeductive reasoning and to provide a characterization of such 
inferences. This is then used to highlight some difficulties to 
which courts must be alert in reviewing experts’ reasoning for 
causal conclusions about toxicity. This Section focuses on causal 
explanations of disease because this is especially germane to 
courts’ tasks in toxic tort cases. 
A.  Deductive and Nondeductive Arguments 
Arguments in support of conclusions are of two kinds: 
deductive and nondeductive.17 Deductive arguments are typical 
of mathematics and formal logic. The defining property of such 
                                                          
14 GILBERT HARMAN, The Inference to the Best Explanation, PHIL. REV., 
74, 89-90 (1964); LARRY WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO ANALYTICAL READING AND REASONING 206, 206-17 (2001). Thagard 
adopts much of this view, indicating that scientists: 
can infer that the factor causes the disease if this hypothesis is 
part of the best explanation of the full range of evidence . . . . 
[and that the factor that is identified as causing] the disease must 
be a better explanation of the correlation between the factor and 
the disease than the assertion that some other cause is 
responsible for both the factor and the disease. 
PAUL THAGARD, HOW SCIENTISTS EXPLAIN DISEASE 129 (1999). 
15 See generally BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE AND CHANCE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC (1966). 
16 This Article does not advocate on either side of the debate, nor does it 
choose between different fundamental accounts. 
17 LARRY WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING 38-46 (1989). 
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arguments is that the conclusion is “guaranteed” logically or 
semantically by the premises: if the premises are true, the 
conclusion must be true.18 In a deductively valid argument, if 
one finds the conclusion to be false, at least one of the premises 
must be false as well. Or, if one accepts the truth of the 
premises, but rejects the truth of the conclusion in a valid 
argument, one contradicts oneself.19 For example, if one accepts 
that A = B and B = C, but denies that A = C, on the face of 
the argument one contradicts oneself. Logical tightness gives 
deductive arguments great inferential power, as the success of 
mathematics and formal logic shows.20 Deductive arguments are 
of limited use in making empirical inferences about the world.21 
By contrast, nondeductive arguments are simply those whose 
conclusions are not guaranteed by their premises.22 These are 
typically utilized in support of empirical claims,23 e.g., an 
explanation of the ocean tides or of benzene causing leukemia. 
Theorists have called such arguments “inferences to the best 
explanation,” “diagnostic arguments,” “diagnostic induction,” 
“inductive arguments,” and “differential diagnosis.”24 In 
nondeductive arguments even if the premises are true, the 
inferential link between premises and conclusions will have 
varying degrees of strength, unlike a deductive argument.25 
Thus, in a nondeductive argument the premises will provide 
strong, weak, or moderate support for the conclusion; one might 
                                                          
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 40. 
20 Theorems of mathematics and formal logic are derived by deductive 
reasoning. 
21 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 38-46. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.; See also HARMAN, supra note 14, at 89 (noting that the term 
“corresponds approximately to what others have called ‘abduction,’ ‘the 
method of hypothesis,’ ‘hypothetic inference,’ ‘the method of elimination,’ 
‘eliminative induction,’ and ‘theoretical inference.’”), and SKYRMS, supra 
note 15. This Article largely uses the phrase “inference to the best 
explanation” because of the reasoning process it suggests. 
25 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 38-46. 
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say that the argument will be strong or weak or in between, but 
not valid or invalid.26 
Moreover, the given premises will provide support for 
different possible conclusions (or as the literature puts it, the 
evidence provided in the premises may be consistent with 
different explanations).27 The task, then, in evaluating such 
inferences is to determine which conclusion is the most plausible 
(or best supported) given the premises (or which explanation 
best accounts for the evidence in the premises). 
B.  Major Steps in Using Nondeductive Reasoning to Make 
Inferences to the Best Explanation for Causes of 
Disease 
This Section highlights the major steps in using nondeductive 
reasoning to make inferences concerning what may have caused 
a disease. A typical first step that would lead to an interest in 
disease causation is that a researcher may notice something that 
needs understanding or calls for an explanation.28 This might be 
a correlation or association between some exposure or condition 
and a disease.29 Once such a correlation has been observed, it 
invites an explanation, if it is sufficiently interesting.30 For 
example, in a polyvinyl chloride plant in Kentucky in the mid-
1970s, occupational physicians noticed three individuals with 
angiosarcoma of the liver (an extremely rare liver cancer).31 
                                                          
26 Id. at 48-50. 
27 Id. at 107-11. 
28 The reconstruction of nondeductive arguments is largely mine, but I 
have learned a great deal from conversations with my colleague Larry Wright 
and his books, especially WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 
99-121, WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 14, and THAGARD, HOW 
SCIENTISTS EXPLAIN DISEASE, supra note 14. 
29 Id. 
30 The mere fact that there are correlations between two things often 
provides something to be explained. See WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, 
supra note 17, at 154. 
31 See generally J.L. Creech, Jr. & M.N. Johnson, Angiosarcoma of 
Liver in the Manufacture of Polyvinyl Chloride, 16 JOURNAL OF 
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Subsequently, they identified ten other cases at vinyl chloride 
plants in the U.S.32 Questions posed about this phenomena 
included: Does this observed correlation have a causal 
explanation or not? If it does, what is it? In the law one would 
ask, “If there is a causal explanation for an observed 
association, is it one for which a responsible party should be 
held accountable or not?” 
Second, in trying to understand casual relationships a 
researcher would consider a sufficiently complete list of 
plausible explanations to account for the evidence.33 This 
important step is one of the “most basic [yet] least understood” 
and difficult steps in nondeductive inferences.34 For this step, 
some philosophers would emphasize finding a list of plausible 
explanations to try to account for the phenomena, and would 
argue that this is based on scientists’ experience, expertise, 
background knowledge, and other evidence of the effects.35 
More Bayesian-oriented theorists would talk of conditioned 
properties.36 When scientists sought to identify the cause of 
                                                          
OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 150 (1974). 
32 Clark W. Heath, Jr., Henry Falk & John L. Creech, Jr., 
Characteristics of Cases of Angiosarcoma of the Liver among Vinyl Chloride 
Workers in the United States, 246 ANNALS NEW YORK ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES 231 (1975). 
33 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 99-102. 
34 SKYRMS, supra note 15, at 107. 
35 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 99-104, esp. 103. 
36 Bayesian-oriented philosophers would, as Skyrms puts it, try to 
ascertain: 
[W]hat factors are likely to be relevant to the conditioned 
property in which we are interested [the thing to be explained]; 
there must be some way of setting up a list of reasonable length 
of possible conditioning properties, which probably contains the 
necessary or sufficient conditions being sought. The only way to 
do this is to apply inductive logic to previously acquired body of 
evidence. 
SKYRMS, supra note 15, at 107. Conditioning properties on Skyrms’ view are 
those that produce a causal effect. His account of “conditioning properties” 
may in fact be somewhat wider than “possible explanations” endorsed by the 
other view, but this is not germane to our discussion (I owe this point to 
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angiosarcoma at the polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plants, they had a 
fortuitously short list of possible causes from which to seek an 
explanation—excessive alcohol usage, exposure to arsenic 
compounds, exposure to thorium dioxide, bad luck, and a 
possible new cause, exposure to vinyl chloride monomers 
(VCM).37 Frequently, the list of possible causes of an adverse 
condition could be much longer or less well-defined. 
Third, scientists would then rank the list of rival 
explanations according to their plausibility or initial degree of 
support based on the evidence available at the time.38 Such 
evidence would include both evidence collected at the time of 
the investigation and background knowledge about the subject 
being studied.39 Plausibility rankings would refer to “the list of 
rival explanations [to explain what is going on] in the order of 
their plausibility.”40 Thus, “[w]hen we judge the [explanatory] 
rivals [of nondeductive arguments] to be more or less plausible, 
we are estimating how well or badly they explain what 
happened, or what is going on, given what we know about it.”41 
Such plausibility judgments have degrees of gradation or degrees 
of strength.42 What was the most plausible initial explanation of 
the liver cancer among polyvinyl chloride workers? 
Fourth, the initial plausibility rankings would in turn provide 
clues about what other evidence might be available that would 
distinguish between the explanations.43 Scientists would seek 
additional evidence to separate the more plausible from the less 
                                                          
Larry Wright). 
37 Heath, et al., supra note 32, at 234; D. B. CLAYSON, TOXICOLOGICAL 
CARCINOGENESIS 11–12 (2001). 
38 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 93-96. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 101. 
41 Id. at 107. 
42 Id. at 47. Individuals can develop skills in ranking the different 
conclusions from the premises based on their plausibility. Such skills are 
quite important for scientists and the explanations they consider within their 
fields. Courts need to recognize the importance of the implicit scientific skill 
in recognizing and utilizing scientific inferences to the best explanation. 
43 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 103-04. 
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plausible explanations.44 What research in the form of tests, 
studies, or background information could help discriminate 
between different explanations and assist the search for a best 
explanation? 
Often, finding such information is much easier said than 
done. Sometimes experiments cannot be conducted; studies 
available may not directly address needed issues; diseases may 
be sufficiently rare, or, conversely, sufficiently common that 
they are difficult to detect; disease processes can be too complex 
at present to discern causes and so on.45 This could be especially 
problematic for the law where studies have not been explicitly 
designed to address the legal questions. In the PVC plant case, 
once researchers suspected that an occupational exposure might 
have caused the cancers, they sought evidence from other PVC 
plants as well as animal studies.46 They found some earlier 
evidence that animals exposed to vinyl chloride contracted 
similar diseases as well as 1972 preliminary results of a study by 
Cesar Maltoni in Italy,47 which reinforced their considerable 
initial concerns that had been based on case reports. 
Fifth, there is widespread agreement that all relevant 
information bearing on possible explanations must be considered 
in drawing a conclusion about which explanation or conditioned 
property is most likely.48 Scientifically “relevant information” is 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 THAGARD, supra note 14, at 131; CARL F. CRANOR, TOXICS TORTS; 
SCIENCE, LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (2006) 170-82. 
46 GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE 
DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 182-83 (2002). 
47 Id. See also Cesare Maltoni, Occupational Carcinogenesis Predicitive 
Value of Carcinogenesis Bioassays, 271 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 431 
(1976). 
48 See, e.g., THAGARD, supra note 14, at 129; SKYRMS, supra note 15, 
at 107; Tom A. Hutchinson & David A. Lane, Assessing Methods for 
Causality Assessment of Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions, 42 J.CLINICAL 
EPIDEMIOL. 5 (1989). See also Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, 
Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical Testimony: Disorder in 
the Courts, J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1382, 1386 (Sept. 18, 2002) (noting writers 
from different methodological perspectives who agree on this point). 
Hutchinson and Lane put this point especially strongly: 
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information that has any impact on the probability of a 
scientist’s conclusions and the plausibility of explanations (or 
conditioned properties).49 Relevance judgments may not always 
be without controversy, but the standard for what constitutes 
“relevant” information is quite minimal, since typically any 
information that can affect a scientist’s belief, ranking of 
possible explanations, probability of conditioned properties or 
conclusions should be included.50 When trying to identify the 
cause of angiosarcoma in PVC plants no epidemiological studies 
were then available. However, there were good case reports 
from the Kentucky plant, as well as a few from some other PVC 
plants, revealing surprising clusters of an unusually rare 
disease.51 Also, good animal studies from Maltoni’s laboratory 
greatly assisted the inferences.52 All of this was relevant 
evidence.53 
What constitutes scientifically relevant information or data 
for drawing a scientific conclusion is a matter of scientific 
                                                          
A causality assessment method must respect Fisher’s 
fundamental rule of uncertain inference—never throw 
information away. That is, any fact, theory or opinion that can 
affect an evaluator’s belief that [a particular exposure] caused an 
adverse event E must be incorporable by the method into the 
‘state of information’ on which the assessment is based. 
Hutchinson & Lane, supra at 10 (emphasis added). 
49 See, e.g., WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104; 
WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 13, at 206-17; SKYRMS, supra note 
14. 
50 Legal conceptions of “relevant” evidence are remarkably similar to 
scientific definitions. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 
541-542 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); FED. R. EVID. 401 
(“Evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”). 
51 Heath, et. al., supra note 32, at 232. 
52 MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 46, at 182-83 (Maltoni found that 
cancers were produced in rats after vinyl chloride exposure at levels lower 
than the existing occupational standard in the U.S.). 
53 Maltoni, supra note 47. 
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judgment.54 This is not intended to be a tautology, but to make 
the point that scientists have the substantive expertise to assess 
what is relevant for making scientific inferences.55 This is not to 
say that a relevance judgment is totally subjective or that it can 
be idiosyncratic; peers can correct other experts. Scientists may 
differ about relevance judgments, but this is likely to be 
unusual, simply because satisfying relevance considerations 
tends to be quite easy.56 Finally, even in cases in which 
scientific conclusions might be controversial, what constitutes 
relevant data may be less controversial than the conclusions 
drawn from the data.57 
Sixth, central to drawing scientific conclusions is a need to 
integrate all the available relevant evidence to come to a 
conclusion.58 In assessing a substance’s toxicity, good scientific 
practice dictates that scientists consider available human 
evidence, evidence from experimental animals, chemical 
structure-biological activity evidence, mechanistic evidence 
(which is rarely available), and so on, in order to evaluate the 
conclusion that follows.59 The metaphor of fitting the pieces of a 
puzzle together to see what “picture” the totality of evidence 
provides is often used to describe this process.60 
                                                          
54 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104. 
55 Id. 
56 WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 14, at 206-17. 
57 From the nature of relevance judgments one can see that they tend to 
be much easier in science and the law than conclusions that might be drawn 
from them. See WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104; 
WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 14, at 206–17; MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra, note 50, at 541-42. 
58 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
COMMITTEE ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE SAFETY OF DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
SAFETY (2005) at 255-56, 262. 
59 V.J. Cogliano, R.A. Baan, K. Straif, Y. Grosse, M. Secretan, F. El 
Ghissassi & P. Kleihues, The Science and Practice of Carcinogen 
Identification and Evaluation, 112 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 
1269, 1272 (2004). 
60 Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of 
Science, 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, (Suppl. 1) S66, S70 
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At the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), 
for example, the scientific committees explicitly go through a 
stepwise process. The committee considers any evidence that a 
substance causes cancer in humans, and evidence that it causes 
cancer in animal studies.61 These lines of evidence are then 
combined to provide a default evaluation of the substance’s 
likelihood of causing cancer in humans.62 The committee then 
considers mechanistic and other kinds of evidence to “determine 
whether the default evaluation should be modified.”63 The 
current director of that program emphasizes the role of scientific 
judgment in integrating evidence and coming to conclusions in 
scientific argument. “The final overall evaluation is a matter of 
scientific judgment, reflecting the weight of the evidence derived 
from studies in humans, studies in experimental animals, and 
mechanistic and other relevant data.”64 
This view of the IARC process makes explicit that 
professional judgment is central to drawing scientific inferences. 
Moreover, scientific judgment has a crucial role at several 
points, not just in drawing a final conclusion. An expert reviews 
data that appear to bear on causal judgments, selects the 
scientifically relevant data, assesses and weighs studies for their 
quality, weighs the importance of different kinds of data vis-à-
vis one another (e.g., animal studies versus human studies 
versus short-term studies versus structure-activity relationships 
versus any case studies), and brings her background 
understanding of biology and toxicology, as well as her 
understanding of the phenomena, to the causal issues. She then 
evaluates different possible explanations in light of all the 
evidence and the particular phenomena (i.e., a disease) that she 
wants to explain. 
An expert considers and integrates all scientifically relevant 
                                                          
(Suppl. 1 2005); Margaret A. Berger, “What Has a Decade of Daubert 
Wrought?” 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH S59, S60 (Suppl. 1 
2005). 
61 Cogliano et. al., supra note 59. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
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evidence in order to assess what it shows. Then the expert enters 
into an assessment of the strength of the best explanation vis-à-
vis alternative explanations. As both medical and legal 
commentators put the point: “In the final analysis, assessment of 
evidence and causal inferences depend on accumulating all 
potentially relevant evidence and making a subjective judgment 
about the strength of the evidence.”65 When professional 
judgment is so central to the drawing of inferences, 
professionals may disagree. 
Finally, the search for causal understanding takes into 
account all relevant information, and focuses on how much more 
probable or plausible an effect is with a cause than without that 
cause.66 For example, was it more plausible that employees in 
the polyvinyl chloride plants contracted their liver cancer as a 
matter of coincidence or from exposure to thorium oxide, 
alcohol consumption, arsenic compounds, or the vinyl chloride 
monomer? In pursuit of the best explanation, a scientist would 
seek evidence that would increase the plausibility “gap” between 
the highest ranked explanation and the next highest ranked one. 
That is, during an investigation, the initially top-ranked 
explanation may gain in strength and plausibility. Alternatively it 
may lose strength, and, thus, the gap between it and other 
possible explanations would narrow (or even disappear 
altogether), which shows that its strength and plausibility 
compared with rival explanations is weakening (or the others 
have risen in plausibility).67 If the evidence supports one 
plausible explanation so overwhelmingly that one can reject all 
other explanations, this would be more a matter of good fortune 
than occurs in typical nondeductive arguments.68 If two 
                                                          
65 Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 48, at 1384. See also Jerome P. 
Kassirer, “Diagnostic Reasoning,” Annals of Internal Medicine 110, 893-900 
(1989); JEROME P. KASSIRER & R. I. KOPELMAN, LEARNING CLINICAL 
REASONING (Williams and Wilkins 1991). 
66 Thagard, supra note 14, at 102; WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, 
supra note 17, at 107. 
67 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 103-06. 
68 For example, HARMAN, supra note 14, at 89-90, seems to be thinking 
of easy cases of nondeductive arguments in which one explanation is so 
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hypotheses have approximately the same plausibility, there might 
be no “best” explanation, but rather two equally plausible rival 
explanations.69 
The overall strategy sketched above in the search for 
explanations is broadly similar across many fields that utilize 
nondeductive arguments. It is widely endorsed by 
epidemiologists,70 toxicologists, methodologists inferring causes 
from well-analyzed case studies,71 governmental scientists 
assessing risks, investigators seeking to explain airplane or space 
shuttle accidents, and ordinary persons making empirical 
inferences.72 
C.  Weight-of-the-Evidence Arguments 
The strength of scientific inferences depends both on the 
truth of the evidentiary claims in the premises and on the 
cumulative support that all the relevant evidence contained in the 
premises offers for the conclusions in question.73 Another name 
for these arguments is “weight-of-the-evidence” arguments.74 
                                                          
superior to all others that one can properly be said to reject them. One 
explanation can be better than another without rejecting the second. 
69 This point follows from Wright’s analysis at WRIGHT, PRACTICAL 
REASONING, supra note 17, at 103-06. 
70 Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or 
Causation? 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 295, 300 (1965), reprinted in 
EVOLUTION OF EPIDEMIOLOGIC IDEAS: ANNOTATED READINGS ON CONCEPTS 
AND METHODS 15-20 (Sander Greenland ed. 1987). See also Douglas Weed, 
Underdetermination and Incommensurability in Contemporary Epidemiology, 
7 KENNEDY INSTI. ETHICS J. 107, 114 (1997). 
71 See, e.g., Hutchinson & Lane, supra note 48, at 12. 
72 For a regulatory use of such inferences, see U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 
61 Fed. Reg.17, 960, 17,961 (Apr. 23, 1996) (to replace 51 Fed. Reg. 33992 
when finalized). One can easily become aware of the implicit nondeductive 
arguments in use around us by noticing the argument form. 
73 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 49. 
74 This is a term often used in regulatory settings, but is not restricted to 
them. Scientists often speak of what conclusion the “weight of the evidence 
supports.” Frequent conversations with David A. Eastmond, Chair, 
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This is a term from both scientific and regulatory contexts.75 
The metaphor “weight-of-the-evidence” is intended to convey 
the persuasiveness of the kind and amount of evidence in favor 
of different conclusions. In regulatory science, for example, 
researchers might be concerned whether a substance is a human 
carcinogen. In such circumstances, scientists consider which 
rival conclusions are better supported by the weight of available 
evidence: Is the substance a human carcinogen; is it is a 
probable human carcinogen; is the evidence so equivocal that 
one cannot decide; or is it not a human carcinogen at all? The 
implicit question to be addressed is whether the weight of the 
available scientific evidence better supports the claim that a 
substance causes (or contributes to), or more likely than not 
causes (or contributes to) cancer or to support some other 
claim.76 Scientists assessing the most likely cause of 
angiosarcoma in PVC plants concluded that the strongest 
explanation, which was quite good, was exposure to vinyl 
chloride monomers.77 
D.  Example: Plaintiffs’ Argument in Allen v. Pennsylvania 
Engineering 
To further illustrate the points about scientific arguments, 
consider in schematic outline an argument offered by plaintiffs 
in Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering.78 This statement of their 
                                                          
Environmental Toxicology, University of California, Riverside. 
75 For example, IARC researchers note that for the conclusions of a 
consensus scientific committee “the final overall evaluation [of evidence that 
a substance is carcinogenic to humans] is a matter of scientific judgment, 
reflecting the weight of the evidence derived from studies in humans, studies 
in experimental animals, and mechanistic and other relevant data.” Cogliano 
et al., supra note 59, at 1272 (emphasis added). 
76 For a discussion of the weight of the evidence procedure, see the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk 
Assessment, 61 FED. REG.17,960, 17,961 (Apr. 23, 1996) (to replace 51 
Fed. Reg. 33992 when finalized). 
77 Heath et. al., supra note 32. 
78 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996). This statement of their argument is 
truncated and does not do it full justice, but it illustrates the points above. 
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argument is truncated and does not do it full justice, but it 
illustrates the above mentioned points. 
1. Walter Allen was periodically, but sporadically, 
exposed to ethylene oxide (ETO), a sterilizing agent, 
while changing ETO cylinders on hospital sterilizing 
units over a 20-year period; he contracted brain cancer 
(“BC”). 
2. Rat studies, but not mice studies, show that ETO 
causes comparatively rare BC and that it can cross the 
blood-brain barrier. 
3. Several small human studies with low exposures 
suggest that ETO is associated with BC. A large meta-
analysis shows no association. 
4. ETO is a small molecule, a direct-acting alkylating 
agent (it interferes with DNA), and a multisite 
mutagen. 
There are clearly several possible conclusions to this 
argument for general causation: 
5a.  It is more likely than not that ETO can cause human 
brain cancer. 
5b. It is not more likely than not that ETO can cause 
human brain cancer. 
5c. One cannot draw any very definitive conclusion from 
the data. 
In addition, there are several possible conclusions concerning 
specific causation (addressing the question of whether Mr. 
Allen’s brain cancer was likely caused by his exposure to 
ethylene oxide). Clearly, one would need to have some more 
developed premises concerning the extent of his exposure, but 
the possible conclusions concerning specific causation would be 
the following: 
6a. It is more likely than not that ETO caused or 
contributed to Mr. Allen’s BC. 
6b. It is more likely that something else caused his BC: 
bad luck, unlucky genes, some other exposure, and so 
on. 
6c. One cannot draw any very definitive inference about 
what caused his BC. 
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In addition to the premises of these arguments supporting 
several possible conclusions, plaintiffs’ experts presented several 
different kinds of evidence as scientifically relevant to the 
inferences they needed to make, e.g., human, molecular and 
animal evidence in particular.79 This evidence, together with 
exposure information taken together, they argued, more likely 
than not showed that ETO can cause brain cancer and did cause 
brain cancer in Mr. Allen.80 
III. WHAT PROBLEMS MIGHT NONDEDUCTIVE INFERENCES POSE 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW? 
Scientific arguments are not readily accessible to those not 
steeped in the substantive scientific fields, nor are they easy to 
evaluate. They have several features that make their assessment 
more difficult for those who are more distant from them on a 
day-to-day basis. First, nondeductive arguments will always 
have gaps between their premises and their conclusions. This is 
readily apparent in the arguments from Allen.81 Courts will need 
to recognize that scientific arguments have such gaps and not 
expect deductive “tightness” in them. 
Second, in utilizing scientific arguments, scientists consider 
all the scientifically relevant evidence in drawing their 
conclusions. There can be, I believe, temptations for those not 
familiar with the scientific substance of such arguments to not 
consider some pieces of evidence because they appear not to 
support conclusions by themselves or to contribute too little to 
conclusions. For example, Mr. Allen’s experts were not 
permitted to utilize all of the scientifically relevant evidence in 
their argument because the court rejected the various pieces of 
evidence individually.82 Thus, courts sometimes seem to struggle 
                                                          
79 Id. at 196. 
80 Expert report by Karl T. Kelsey and Anthony D. LaMontagne for 
plaintiffs (October 13, 1992) in Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 
194 (5th Cir. 1996). 
81 See supra Section II.D. 
82 Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d at 198. 
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with scientifically relevant evidence on which scientists typically 
rely, or to review each “piece” of evidence for whether it 
strongly supports plaintiffs’ ultimate causal conclusion.83 Finally, 
in drawing conclusions, scientists consider all the relevant 
evidence as an integrated whole.84 Since scientists view the 
evidence as a whole, courts will need to recognize this and 
assess the evidence as an integrated whole when reviewing 
expert testimony for admissibility (the Allen court did not permit 
this).85 This does not ease courts’ tasks, but arguably makes 
them more difficult because judges must review the scientific 
substance of an expert’s argument (taking account of all the 
relevant evidence) to ensure that it is sufficiently plausible to 
assist a jury. 
A.  Gaps in Scientific Arguments 
All nondeductive arguments will have gaps because there is 
no logically tight relationship between premises and 
conclusion.86 The gaps in the argument from Allen v. 
Pennsylvania Engineering exist not merely because I presented a 
brief statement of more elaborate arguments. The gaps are 
traceable to the structure of the arguments themselves.87 Even 
the best inferences can appear to have gaps, simply because it is 
easy to conceive alternative conclusions to the arguments. 
For example, no matter how well established Newtonian 
gravitational theory is to describe the attraction of physical 
objects on the surface of the earth and near celestial bodies, one 
                                                          
83 Id. 
84 See supra Section II.C. 
85 Courts must conduct reviews in this manner, if they are to assess 
scientific arguments (testimony) as scientists do. 
86 Supra Section II.A. 
87 There is no logically tight relationship between premises and 
conclusion. Moreover, there is a more subtle point: how elaborate and 
detailed such arguments need to be presented very much depends upon the 
substantive understanding of those to whom the argument is addressed. 
Comparable experts will need less elaborate arguments than less well 
informed readers. 
CRANOR_2 3/3/2007  12:57 AM 
 ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS 27 
might easily ask whether it applies to far away bodies with 
which we are not familiar.88 For another example, a well-known 
astronomer, Thomas Gold, contrary to well-grounded views in 
geology, argued until his death that oil does not come from 
decomposed organic matter (such as plants and dinosaurs), but 
from geologic processes deep within the earth’s core.89 Also, no 
matter how well established evolution is, any relationships 
between premises based on existing evidence and conclusions 
are not  so “tight” as to deter some from easily suggesting 
alternative theological explanations for the observed phenomena. 
This does not mean they are right, only that it is comparatively 
easy to imagine or find some kinds of gaps in the argument. 
The possibility of gaps provides openings for skepticism 
about nondeductive arguments and may raise judicial concerns 
about them.90 If premises support alternative conclusions, this 
can easily invite skepticism about a particular conclusion a 
scientist has drawn, even if the challenge is not particularly 
well-founded by evidence. It is effortless to be a skeptic; one 
needs only to suggest a different possible conclusion to the 
argument or notice a gap in the argument and exploit it.91 The 
possibility of skepticism toward scientific arguments may 
reinforce any natural skepticism judges have toward the 
arguments of adversarial counsel and experts. Moreover, the 
obvious gaps in arguments will likely increase difficulties courts 
will have in reviewing them because it will correctly appear that 
                                                          
88 At one time I suggested this as a speculative comment. However, in 
recent years, two physicists, Mordehai Hilgrom and Jacop Bekenstein, have 
proposed that the appropriate force equations for certain very distant galaxies 
is F=ma2/a0 (where F is force, m is the mass of the object, a
2 is acceleration 
and a0 is a cosmological constant) instead of F=ma (force equals mass times 
acceleration). This view would modify early Newtonian views. Adam Frank, 
Gravity’s Gadfly, DISCOVER: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE, 32-
37 (August 2006). 
89 Lissa Harris, CU’s Thomas Gold, noted astronomer and ‘gadfly,’ is 
dead at 84, CORNELL CHRON. (Jul. 1,2004), available at 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/Chronicle/04/7.1.04/Tom.Gold.obit.html. 
90 This was a concern of the Supreme Court in Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
91 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104. 
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every such argument has a gap. However, the mere presence of 
gaps alone should not disqualify a scientific argument from 
being presented to a jury because every nondeductive argument 
has a gap. The challenge for courts is to review arguments in an 
informed and thoughtful manner. 
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, a gap in plaintiffs’ 
argument was a concern of the district court (and ultimately the 
Supreme Court) in reviewing Joiner’s weight-of-the-evidence 
argument (inference to the best explanation) that he had 
contracted lung cancer at least in part because of exposure to 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).92 The Court noticed a “gap” 
between plaintiff’s animal evidence and the experts’ opinion.93 It 
urged that there could be too great a “gap” between data on 
which experts rely and a scientist’s opinion testimony.94 But if 
there is always some gap, how should judges review such 
arguments? Moreover, can they review expert testimony without 
comparing plaintiff’s conclusions with defendant’s conclusions, 
as the original Daubert decision cautioned against? 
First, not every nondeductive argument admits of legitimate 
critique simply because it has a gap. Some will be quite solid 
and strong—oil comes from decomposed organic matter—or 
some even implausible—Martians caused the space shuttle 
Challenger disaster. Second, in reviewing expert arguments 
courts will need to consider a scientist’s conclusion in relation to 
the data and information on which it is based, but they should 
only consider a conclusion in relation to the evidence in the 
argument in order to assess arguments as scientists would. 
Good argument evaluation would not license the conclusion 
to be considered in isolation from all the scientifically relevant 
evidentiary premises in support of it.95 Moreover, the law on the 
admissibility of evidence does not permit a comparison between 
plaintiff’s conclusion (or argument) and defendant’s scientific 
                                                          
92 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141, 146 (1997). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. The Court’s reaction to this evidence was likely an overreaction. 
See CRANOR, supra note 45. 
95 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 114. 
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conclusion (or argument), unless there is simply no issue of 
material fact to be resolved between parties.96 Thus, for 
admissibility a judge would need to make some minimal 
assessment of the strength of a scientist’s nondeductive argument 
to see whether it is sufficiently minimally plausible for legal 
purposes.97 Following this step, some courts, beginning with the 
Daubert litigation and subsequent to it, appear to have engaged 
in a comparative weighing of plaintiff’s evidence with 
defendant’s evidence prior to trial, but that is controversial, 
simply because it appears to intrude on the jury’s authority.98 
There can be arguments, of course, in which all the data on 
which experts rely so poorly support the inferences drawn that 
one might say they have no support at all. When this occurs it is 
probably better to say not that there is “too great a gap between 
data and the conclusions drawn from them,” but, rather, that the 
conclusion is simply too “speculative” given the evidence in the 
premises.99 
                                                          
96 FED. R. CIV. P., 56 C. 
97 See also supra Section IV. 
98 See, e.g., Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 131 (Ariz. 2000) (“The 
Daubert/Joiner/Kumho trilogy of cases . . . puts the judge in the position of 
passing on the weight or credibility of the expert’s testimony, something we 
believe crosses the line between the legal task of ruling on the foundation and 
relevance of evidence and the jury’s function of whom to believe and why, 
whose testimony to accept, and on what basis.”); Howerton v. Arai Helmet, 
Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 692 (N.C. 2004) (“[T]rial courts asserting. . .authority 
under Daubert may unnecessarily encroach upon the constitutionally-
mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and to assess the weight 
of the evidence.”); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 472 (Wyo. 1999) 
(adopting Daubert, but nonetheless expressing concern that applying the 
Daubert approach to exclude evidence has been criticized as a 
“misappropriation of the jury’s responsibilities,” and that “‘it is imperative 
that the jury retain its fact-finding function’” (quoting Springfield v. State, 
860 P.2d 435 (Wyo.1993)); Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 
2d 1291, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (applying Daubert, but noting that the jury’s 
right to decide the facts of the case is usurped when a trial court 
“overreach[es] in the gatekeeping function” and “determine[s] whether the 
opinion evidence is correct or worthy of credence.”). 
99 Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving 
Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 236 (2000). 
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B.  Potential Problems with Scientific Relevance 
A second set of potential problems with scientific inferences 
concerns the scientific relevance of studies, data, and 
information on which an expert bases her testimony. Courts 
have had some difficulties with animal studies, case reports and 
molecular evidence. A generic difficulty appears to be that 
courts have engaged in assessing individual pieces of evidence as 
a means of reviewing an experts’ overall testimony (or 
argument).100 Such a method for analyzing scientific arguments 
confuses an assessment of the overall argument with an 
assessment of one piece of the evidence (or one premise) in the 
argument.101 It conflates the analysis of the argument as a whole 
with analysis of the evidence in one premise of the argument. 
Such an approach is fraught with numerous difficulties. 
In order to see these difficulties, several distinct questions 
should be introduced. First, is a particular piece of evidence 
relevant to assist a scientific inference about toxicity? Second, if 
it is scientifically relevant, how much weight or (in legal terms) 
probative value does, and should, it have in an overall inference 
about toxicity?102 Third, does one piece of evidence taken by 
itself provide sufficient support for a scientist’s toxicity 
conclusion?103 Finally, does all the relevant evidence considered 
provide a sufficiently plausible argument for the expert’s 
conclusion, so he or she may be admitted to testify to assist the 
jury? Failure to distinguish at least these four questions can 
contribute to confusion about the issues and frustrate 
scientifically accurate reviews of expert testimony. 
One issue is whether a piece of scientific evidence is 
scientifically relevant to an inference of toxicity or to a 
                                                          
100 As explained below, this clearly occurred in Allen v. Pa. Eng’g 
Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996), and seemed to be endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-46 (1997), 
which led Justice Stevens to register his dissent at 150-55. 
101 Confusing court language in the original Daubert decision as well as 
subsequent commentary and court decisions has contributed to this. 
102 WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 123. 
103 Id. 
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judgment of the relative plausibility of different explanations of 
the evidence. As noted above, it should be easy for evidence to 
satisfy the relevance criteria—if it would have any impact, 
positive or negative, on the plausibility of different explanations, 
it is relevant. 
Before introducing the other points, reconsider the argument 
from Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering.104 The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reviewed a judge’s exclusion of plaintiffs’ 
experts.105 The court of appeals held that epidemiological studies 
did not show ETO caused or contributed to brain cancer in 
humans.106 Next, referring to Brock v. Merrell-Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc,107 the Court noted that animal studies 
“must be carefully qualified in order to have explanatory 
potential for human beings.”108 Then, quoting defense experts, 
the court argued that the rat studies could not be reliably 
extrapolated to humans, holding that studies showing that rats 
contracted brain cancer, “furnishes at best speculative support 
for appellants’ causation theory.”109 Finally, the Court argued 
that while the cell biology shows ETO to have mutagenic and 
genotoxic properties in living systems, this does not necessarily 
show it can cause brain cancer in humans or did cause brain 
cancer in Mr. Allen.110 The court concluded: “[N]one of the 
                                                          
104 See supra Section II.D. 
105 Plaintiffs used a more elaborate version of the argument sketched 
above in supra Section II.D. 
106 Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (“First, 
although occupational exposure to ETO has been studied for many years, not 
a single scientific study has revealed a link between human brain cancer and 
ETO exposure.”). 
107 Brock v. Merrill-Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 
1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989). 
108 Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d at 197. 
109 Id. (“[T]he lack of capacity for the F-344 rat to predict how even the 
mouse model responds necessarily undercuts confidence that the rat will 
predict accurately how other species including humans will respond [to EtO 
exposure].”). 
110 Id. at 198. (“Third, the cell biology data show only that ETO has 
mutagenic and genotoxic capabilities in living organisms, not that it 
necessarily causes brain cancer in humans or in Allen’s particular case. That 
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scientific data on which appellants’ experts rely furnishes a 
scientifically valid basis for the conclusion they would draw. 
The paucity of epidemiological evidence, the unreliability of 
animal studies, and the inconclusiveness of cell biology combine 
to undercut the expert testimony.”111 
We see in this decision some court language that is fairly 
common. Instead of assessing the scientists’ argument (their 
testimony) based on all the relevant evidence, the court 
addressed each piece of evidence by itself. One reason for this 
approach may be that the judges were concerned about the 
scientific relevance of the individual pieces of evidence to the 
expert’s arguments, and whether plaintiffs’ expert could use 
them to draw a conclusion. They did not use this language, 
however. 
Moreover, given the idea of scientific relevance, judges 
should exercise considerable care in assessing whether individual 
pieces of evidence are scientifically relevant, simply because 
they are so intellectually distant from the relevant fields and 
because criteria of both scientific and legal relevance are easy to 
satisfy.112 Of course, they could query experts on such issues 
and inquire about how the evidence might affect (however 
slightly) their argument.113 That is, they could ask, “How does 
this piece of evidence contribute (however slightly) to your 
argument?” 
Could the judges in Allen have been concerned that each 
piece of evidence was so poor that it could not even have been 
scientifically relevant for the toxicity judgment? Their assertions 
about animal evidence could have been so construed: they held 
that the fact that ethylene oxide caused brain tumors in rats 
could not be evidence for the claim that ETO could cause brain 
tumors in humans, simply because ETO did not correspondingly 
                                                          
ETO may have these effects on living cells or genes is the beginning, not the 
end of the scientific inquiry and proves nothing about causation without other 
scientific evidence.”). 
111 Id. 
112 See supra notes 49-50. 
113 They would in effect have a discussion on how such evidence was 
relevant to the conclusion for which they argued. 
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cause brain tumors in phylogenetically similar mice.114 That is, 
they might have believed the rat evidence was simply 
scientifically irrelevant to humans. Had they explicitly used such 
an argument that would have been clearer. However, if this was 
their concern, there is independent evidence that they were 
mistaken on scientific grounds.115 This is a risk of non-scientists 
reviewing the details of scientific arguments. 
The court might not have understood (because it was too 
distant from the science), or plaintiffs might not have adequately 
                                                          
114 Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). 
115 As part of an NSF-funded research project at UC Riverside, David 
Eastmond and I sought scientific peer reviews of expert reports in a small 
number of legal cases. Allen was one. We sent the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
expert reports without names or affiliations attached to two extramural 
referees who were experts in the toxicology of ETO and one epidemiologist. 
Following the lead of some federal judges and the language from Kumho Tire 
we asked them whether the experts’ opinions fell within a range where 
“reasonable experts would disagree.” Both an industry oriented scientist and 
a non-industry scientist agreed that plaintiffs presented good scientific 
arguments that ethylene more likely than not could cause brain cancer. 
Consider just one expert’s view. 
The evidence presented by these experts clearly establishes ETO as a 
carcinogen with a high likelihood of human risk. They appropriately cited 
literature showing that ETO is a direct-acting DNA alkylating agent, is 
mutagenic in multiple in vivo and in vitro studies including human cells, and 
consistently showed induction of chromosomal damage in peripheral 
lymphocytes of exposed workers (chromosomal aberrations, sister chromatid 
exchanges, and micronuclei). ETO also induces heritable translocations in 
rodents (not mentioned by the plaintiff’s experts). The plaintiff’s experts also 
cited studies showing tumor induction at multiple sites, including brain, in 
male and female rats exposed to EtO, and they cited studies demonstrating 
that EtO forms DNA adducts in the brain. The latter piece of information is 
important because it demonstrates that EtO can cross the blood brain barrier. 
(Peer review of plaintiffs’ expert’s report by anonymous reviewer, Jan. 12, 
2004) (any emphases in the original). 
Moreover, one expert noted (and then went on to illustrate the view) that 
“The defendant’s experts made several unjustified assumptions and 
misstatements to support their contention that the plaintiff’s brain tumor was 
not due to exposure to ETO.” (Peer review of defendants’ expert’s report by 
anonymous reviewer, Jan. 12, 2004). This issue is discussed more fully in 
CRANOR, supra note 45 at 324-28. 
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explained, the significance of the rat studies even in the absence 
of similar results from mouse studies. It can be argued that in 
this case rats would be a better model for predicting effects in 
humans simply because rats generally have a slower metabolism 
and breathing rate than mice, thus retaining ETO in their bodies 
more like humans.116 The rat studies also show that the small 
molecule of ethylene oxide can cross the blood-brain barrier, 
something that it is typically difficult for chemicals to do.117 
If ETO can have this biological effect in rats, which have a 
metabolism that is more similar to humans than mice, it is 
plausible that ETO can have this biological effect in humans, 
which is what plaintiffs had argued.118 Toxicologists would 
explain ethylene oxide’s inability to cross the mouse blood-brain 
barrier as based on special features of mice that make them 
different from rats and humans.119 By contrast, rats’ slower 
metabolism and respiratory rates would result in them retaining 
ETO longer, giving that small molecule time for absorption into 
various tissues, including the brain.120 The Allen court seemed to 
assume that there was something special about rats, which was 
not applicable to mice and to humans, when the opposite appears 
to be true: the mice have special features that distinguish them 
                                                          
116 Interview with David A. Eastmond, (June 2003). 
117 The blood-brain barrier can be characterized as one that: 
is not an absolute barrier to the passage of toxic agents into the 
CNS [Central Nervous System]. Instead, it represents a site that 
is less permeable than are most other areas of the body. 
Nevertheless, many poisons do not enter the brain in appreciable 
quantities because of this barrier. 
Karl K. Rozman & Curtis D. Klasassen, Absorption, Distribution, and 
Excretion of Toxicants, in CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 6th ed., 86 
(Curtis D. Klaassen ed., McGraw-Hill 2001) 107-32, 122. The blood-brain 
barrier is a physiological barrier that seems to have evolved to provide 
protections to the brain. Id. at 122-23. 
118 Karl T. Kelsey & Anthony D. LaMontagne, Plaintiff’s Expert 
Opinion Aff.; Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
119 Interview with David A. Eastmond, Chair, Environmental 
Toxicology, University of California, Riverside, May 2003. 
120 Id. 
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from rats and make their responses less applicable to humans.121 
However, the court did not use the language of relevance, 
but instead sometimes asked whether each piece of evidence was 
reliable.122 This suggests its concern might have been a) whether 
one piece of evidence is or can be sufficiently reliable by itself 
to support an expert’s overall conclusion, perhaps b) whether by 
itself it can provide major support for a conclusion or maybe c) 
whether it unerringly contributes support to a conclusion.123 
Despite some passages in the Supreme Court’s Daubert opinion, 
the discussion of animal evidence in Joiner and some other 
courts’ opinions, this is puzzling. No single piece of evidence 
about toxicity is ever likely to support a conclusion—such an 
expectation is both scientifically mistaken and an unreasonable 
interpretation of nondeductive arguments.124 Moreover, if a 
scientist or a court can challenge each piece of evidence 
individually as insufficiently reliable to support an expert’s 
conclusion, this would almost certainly undermine every 
scientific argument because they are typically based on multiple 
premises (pieces of evidence) in support of conclusions 
For example, Watson and Crick’s well-known paper on the 
structure of DNA rested on several considerations that 
individually seemed like comparatively weak evidence.125 
However, taken together, Susan Haack argues, the evidence 
supports an inference concerning the “structure of DNA [that] is 
very well warranted (in fact, the only entry that fits).”126 This 
                                                          
121 CRANOR, supra note 45, at 325. 
122 Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
123 See id. at 197-98 (discussing possibilities of interpretation). 
124 In a typical argument a single piece of evidence might appear to be 
very important (and in fact can be very important), but it typically has this 
significance because of the presence of other pieces of evidence utilized in the 
inference. See Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance 
and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need 
for Liability Reform?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 34-41 (2001). See also 
CRANOR, supra note 45, at 313-14 for discussion of some examples. 
125 See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
126 Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-bush: At the Supreme 
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argument, as we now know, has revolutionized biology. Had the 
review procedures of some judges been applied to this ground-
breaking paper, it might have died a premature and mistaken 
death. 
Finally, no kind of evidence—epidemiological,  animal, or 
molecular studies—unerringly supports a conclusion concerning 
toxicity. Whether a particular piece of evidence does contribute 
to a conclusion depends upon what it shows, as well as the other 
evidence utilized in the argument. Sometimes molecular 
evidence can be quite strong as it is for the toxicity of ethylene 
oxide127 and sometimes not. Sometimes case reports can be 
especially strong evidence as they were in identifying the 
toxicity of vinyl chloride and sometimes not.128 
There is a cluster of deeper and more disturbing issues. 
                                                          
Court with Mr. Joiner, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L 217, 237 (2001). See 
also supra  note 102. 
127 See discussion and accompanying supra infra notes 77-79. 
128 The idea of reliable evidence is puzzling and troubling as it has come 
to be utilized in legal decisions. The Court in Daubert might have had in 
mind the reliability of underlying tests in support of a legal case as 
defendants argued the blood pressure test was reliable in Frye. This was a 
test or technique that directly addressed one of the key legal issues of that 
case—was the defendant telling the truth? Moreover, it is possible that such a 
test could be quite accurate, e.g., 90 percent accurate, in providing evidence 
about who was telling the truth and who was lying, but of course it was not. 
However, using reviews of such techniques as an analogy for reviewing a 
variety of pieces of evidence that would assist scientists in coming to 
judgments about the toxicity of a substance is likely to be misleading. 
Sometimes individual structure-activity or mechanistic evidence can quite 
helpful in assessing the toxicity of a product when combined with other 
information and sometimes not. CRANOR, supra note 45, at 111-15, 245-48. 
Sometimes an epidemiological study will be very helpful when it shows a 
positive association between exposure and disease and sometimes not. Usually 
negative or “no effect” epidemiological studies are quite misleading if they 
are taken to provide evidence that there is no adverse effect from exposure. 
Id. at 27, 243-45, 264, 277. Individual pieces of toxicity evidence do not lend 
themselves readily to being judged “reliable” or not for the ultimate toxicity 
questions; their contribution to a toxicity judgment is properly assessed in the 
presence of all the other evidence in support of a toxicity claim and how well 
all the evidence taken together supports the toxicity conclusion. 
CRANOR_2 3/3/2007  12:57 AM 
 ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS 37 
Several courts appear to have rejected whole categories or kinds 
of evidence as insufficiently reliable to support a scientist’s 
conclusions. Some have rejected animal studies, and molecular 
evidence, and many have rejected human case reports.129 Each 
of these can easily be scientifically relevant evidence, 
well-endorsed by scientists, and, depending upon the other 
evidence available in a particular case, each can be especially 
powerful. 
1. Animal Studies 
A variety of considerations point to the scientific relevance 
and probative value of animal studies in making toxicity 
judgments. National and international consensus scientific 
committees routinely rely upon animal evidence for judging the 
toxicity of substances. Consider carcinogens as an example, 
which is an especially well developed area. The International 
Agency for Research on Cancer lists about sixty-six substances 
or groups of substances, excluding mixtures and exposure 
conditions, as probable human carcinogens.130 For more than 
                                                          
129 On animal studies, for example, consider two cases: Plaintiff’s expert 
. . . relied on a study of the effect of picloram on rats that 
showed that when exposed to large amounts of the chemical, the 
rats developed cancerous tumors and died. He admitted that the 
effects of chemicals differ between humans and rats . . . . We 
then are left to conclude that the study, at most, is only evidence 
that picloram may produce some unidentified effect on humans. 
Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987). “The animal 
studies are not helpful in the instant case because they involve different 
biological species. They are of so little probative force and are so potentially 
misleading as to be inadmissible.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 
611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). For some discussion of case 
reports see CRANOR, supra note 45, at 256-57 and Section B.3 infra, at notes 
162-80. Other courts have admitted testimony based on animal studies. Some 
of these are summarized in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
717, 780 (3d Cir. 1994). 
130 IARC, Overall Evaluation of Carcinogenicity to Humans, Group 2A: 
Probably Carcinogenic to Humans, Group 2A: Probably Carcinogenic to 
Humans, MONOGRAPH SERIES. REV. (July 7, 2004); available at 
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forty of these substances (about 60 percent), evidence of 
carcinogenicity in humans is inadequate or limited.131 
Nonetheless, the overall classification is based on sufficient 
evidence in animal studies plus “other data relevant to the 
evaluation of carcinogenicity and its mechanisms.”132 The U.S. 
National Toxicology Program lists about 185 substances as 
“reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen.” Of these, a 
large percentage has been identified on the basis of good animal 
studies.133 This has been confirmed by agency personnel.134 
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) classifies 
substances as probable human carcinogens based upon animal 
studies, even if the evidence that a substance is carcinogenic to 
humans is inadequate.135 These are substances “likely to produce 
cancer in humans due to the production or anticipated production 
of tumors by modes of action that are relevant or assumed to be 
relevant to human carcinogenicity.”136 
Scientific principles underscore the importance of animal 
studies and point to the foundation for the use of animal studies 
described above. Huff and Rall summarize considerable science: 
From data available so far, therefore, it appears that 
chemicals that are carcinogenic in laboratory animals 
are likely to be carcinogenic in human populations 
and that, if appropriate studies can be performed, 
                                                          
httyp://www-cie.iarc.fr/moneval/crthgr02a.htm (listing 66 substances that are 
known human carcinogens). 
131 That is, studies would be of insufficient quality to permit an inference 
concerning human carcinogenicity, or the association is credible, but 
alternative explanations of the positive results cannot be ruled out with 
sufficient confidence to justify a causal inference. See id. 
132 See id. 
133 Criteria were first listed and published on September 26, 1996, and 
are listed at the NTP Web site, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntpweb/ 
index.cfm?objectid=03C9CE38-E5CD-EE56-D21B9. 
134 Interview with Ronald Melnick, National Institute of Environmental 
Health Science, in Brooklyn N.Y. (March 3, 2006). 
135 Environmental Protection Agency Proposed Guidelines for 
Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17, 17960, 17985 (Apr. 23, 
1996). 
136 Id. 
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there is qualitative predictability. Also, there is 
evidence that there can be a quantitative relationship 
between the amount of a chemical that is carcinogenic 
in laboratory animals and that which is carcinogenic 
in human populations.137 
This conclusion is supported by more specific relationships 
identified by scientists. Although there are readily apparent 
differences between laboratory animals and humans (such as 
external physical characteristics, lifespan, metabolic rate, and 
heterogeneity) that too often receive greater attention than 
similarities, “experimental evidence to date certainly suggests 
that there are more physiologic, biochemical and metabolic 
similarities between laboratory animals and humans than there 
are differences.”138 The “biological processes of molecular, 
cellular, tissue, and organ functions that control life are 
strikingly similar from one mammalian species to another.”139 In 
addition, based upon current information, there is great 
similarity in the carcinogenic processes between animals and 
humans.140 Furthermore, “the more we know about the 
similarities of structure and function of higher organisms at the 
molecular level, the more we are convinced that mechanisms of 
chemical toxicity are, to a large extent, identical in animals and 
man.”141 The toxicology authors in the Federal Judicial Center 
Manual on Scientific Evidence and the EPA agree.142 A 2005 
                                                          
137 James Huff & David P. Rall, Relevance to Humans of Carcinogenesis 
Results from Laboratory Animal Toxicology Studies, in Maxcy-Rosenau Last 
Public Health & Preventive Medicine 433, 437 (John M. Last & Robert B. 
Wallace eds., 13th ed. 1992). 
138 David P. Rall et al., Alternatives to Using Human Experience in 
Assessing Health Risks, 8 ANN. REV. PUBL. HEALTH 355, 356 (1987). 
139 Id. at 434. 
140 Some researchers make even stronger claims. For example, see James 
Huff, Chemicals and Cancer in Humans: First Evidence in Experimental 
Animals, 100 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 201, 204 (1993) (stating that the array 
and multiplicity of carcinogenic processes are virtually common among 
mammals, for instance between laboratory rodents and humans). 
141 Id. at 204. 
142 See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary S. Henifin, Reference Guide on 
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Institute of Medicine and National Research Council report gives 
animal studies a strong endorsement, echoing numerous earlier 
reports. According to this report, animal studies are: 
powerful because controlled studies can be conducted 
to predict effects that might not be detected from 
customary use by humans until they result in overt 
harmful effects. Animal studies are especially useful 
in detecting effects of chronic exposures and effects 
on reproductive and developmental processes because 
epidemiological methods of studying humans are 
especially problematic in these areas . . . .143 
Recall also how animal studies were especially strong 
evidence in identifying vinyl chloride monomer as a human 
carcinogen. 
Despite these findings, courts may nonetheless be concerned 
about inferences from animals to humans. However, such 
concerns can be misplaced. Consider a hypothetical example 
similar to one used by the Federal Judicial Center and the 
Judicial Council of California to assist in educating judges about 
scientific evidence: 
Suppose a hypothetical plaintiff Mr. Jones was 
exposed to XXBC in drinking water. As evidence for 
the toxicity of XXBC, suppose in one study mice 
exposed to 5 milligrams of substance XXBC per 
kilogram of body weight have approximately six 
times the rate of liver cancer as unexposed mice. The 
                                                          
Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 421 (Federal 
Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000) and Environmental Protection Agency 
Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, supra note 72, at 
17977 (“[T]here is evidence that growth control mechanisms at the level of 
the cell are homologous among mammals, but there is no evidence that these 
mechanisms are site concordant [i.e., must be in the same tissue in rodents 
and humans].”). 
143 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
COMMITTEE ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE SAFETY OF DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
SAFETY 157 (National Academies Press 2005) [hereinafter DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS]. 
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disease rate in the exposed mice was .20 (18 of 90 
mice in this group had tumors) compared with the 
control group (3 of 90 had tumors, a disease rate of 
.03). Thus, the disease rate in mice attributable to 
XXBC is 17/100 or 17 percent. The dose to which 
the experimental mice were exposed was 170 times 
that to which Mr. Jones was exposed. Suppose there 
were similar results in rat studies. Suppose also that 
the evidence from the two rodent studies suggests that 
XXBC was a genotoxic carcinogen and that there was 
a linear relationship between dose and response.144 
In addition, although were no statistically significant human 
studies exist, Mr. Jones and a few others who were sampled in 
the area had DNA damage consistent with DNA damage seen in 
animal studies, but these studies were not statistically 
significant.145 Major alternative explanations of Mr. Jones’ liver 
cancer (hepatitis B and exposure to aflatoxins) could be ruled 
out with reasonable confidence.146 
Consider only the exposure of mice compared with 
exposures of humans. Many people may believe because rodents 
receive higher doses of a substance than those to which humans 
are exposed, that such studies are irrelevant to humans. 
However, this may result from a misunderstanding of the 
studies, a considerable public relations campaign against them, 
and, in any case, is often a red herring. Given the above 
information, scientists can calculate the likely disease rate for 
humans who had lower environmental exposures to XXBC. It is 
simply the disease rate in the animals divided by the much 
higher dosage they received because the toxicant acts by means 
of a linear mechanism. Thus, in the exposed animals the disease 
rate was 17/100 or 17 percent. If there were a particular cancer 
in 17 percent of the population, it would be among the very 
                                                          
144 University of California/Judicial Council Summit, CASE STUDY 
VIGNETTE: Toxic Tort, Oct. 3, 2006. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
CRANOR_2 3/3/2007  12:57 AM 
42 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
highest cancer rates!147 Discounting the disease rate in humans 
by their lesser dose (170 times smaller) would yield a disease 
rate in an exposed human population (at the lower dosage) of 
1/1000. A cancer rate of 1/1000 in an exposed human 
population would have to be compared with the rate in the 
general unexposed human population to see whether the relative 
risk was sufficiently high to merit legal compensation, and 
scientists would have to determine whether the particular 
individual had other possible exposures or conditions that would 
have increased his liver disease rate. 
However, to make things simple, if liver cancer rate in the 
general population were 1/2000, those exposed to XXBC (at the 
assumed level) would have double the risk of liver cancer 
compared with the general population (or a relative risk of 2:1). 
If the disease rate in the general population were lower, e.g., 
1/5000, the relative risk for those exposed to XXBC would be 
even greater (5:1). This would be quite a high relative risk. 
To conclude, animal studies are relevant evidence for 
addressing the toxicity of a substance for general causation in 
the law because scientists routinely rely upon them for the 
reasons given above. Moreover, particular animal studies should 
not be disqualified as evidence for causation simply because 
animals are exposed to higher doses of a toxicant than humans. 
In particular, one would not tolerate a disease rate in humans as 
high as 17 percent of the exposed population as existed among 
rodents in the hypothetical example above. Finally, animal 
evidence can be quite powerful for general causation and 
possibly for specific causation in the law, as the above example 
shows, when appropriate extrapolations can be made. Of course, 
not all animal studies will necessarily be as valuable as the 
hypothetical, but animal evidence is often relevant and powerful, 
especially for carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. 
                                                          
147 For comparison, a woman’s chances of contracting breast cancer 
between birth and 70 years of age is 7.13% and her chances of contracting it 
between birth and death is 13.22%. A man’s chances of contracting prostate 
cancer between birth and 70 years of age is 14.51% and of contracting it 
between birth and death is 17.93%. American Cancer Society, Surveillance 
Research, http://www.cancer.org/downloads/stt/CAFF06Prob.pdf. 
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2. Molecular Evidence 
A second kind of toxicological evidence that can be quite 
important, but that fares badly in courts, is evidence about the 
molecular structure and its attendant biological activity in 
mammalian systems. For example, the Allen court struggled 
with the relevance of molecular studies, noting that they were 
“the beginning, not the end of the scientific inquiry and proves 
nothing about causation without other scientific evidence.”148 
The court excluded the molecular data and subsequently the 
expert as well.149 
A standard toxicology textbook notes the importance of 
molecular evidence: “An agent’s structure, solubility, stability, 
pH sensitivity, electrophilicity, volatility and chemical reactivity 
can be important information for hazard identification [that is, 
for identifying hazards caused by substances].”150 “Historically, 
certain key molecular structures have provided regulators with 
some of the most readily available information on the basis of 
which to assess hazard potential.”151 These include information 
about some carcinogens, structural alerts for “aromatic amine 
groups,” and certain dyes as potential carcinogens. Some 
provide important information about developmental toxicants.152 
The Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 
addressing the toxicity of dietary supplements, highlights the 
underlying scientific rationale for the significance of structure-
activity data for identifying adverse effects of toxicants: 
The physical-chemical properties and biological 
effects of a substance are derived from its chemical 
                                                          
148 Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996). 
149 This court might have believed that the molecular evidence was 
scientifically relevant, but inadequate in the absence of what it saw as other 
needed evidence to support the causation claims (some of its arguments 
suggest this point). Id at 197-98. 
150 ELAINE M. FAUSTMAN & GILBERT S. OMENN, Risk Assessment, in 
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structure. If the chemical structure of a dietary 
supplement is known, but additional insight into the 
biological activity is needed, then it is scientifically 
appropriate to consider the information about the 
biological activity of structurally related substances. It 
is assumed that the biological effects of chemicals, 
including toxic effects, are implicit in their molecular 
structures (referred to as toxicophores when they are 
associated with toxic effects). This concept is most 
clearly illustrated with the example of ephedra, which 
is considered by some scientists to have similar 
physiological actions, although less potent, to the 
chemically related substance amphetamine, as well as 
the recently banned pharmaceutical agent 
phenylpropanolamine.153 
Scientists also recognize that certain classes of structure-
activity relationships have been quite important in identifying 
chemical groups that are known to interact with mammalian 
DNA or proteins. Such relationships provide strong, but not 
quite infallible, reasons for thinking that substances with 
chemical similarities have similar biological activity.154 
Courts can be quite dismissive of molecular or chemical 
structure data.155 One possible reason is that similar chemical 
structures are not mathematically certain guides to similar 
toxicity effects, but mathematical certainty is not required in tort 
                                                          
153 DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 205-06, citing Food and 
Drug Administration, 69 Fed. Reg. 6787, 6787-854 (2005); I. Furuya & S. 
Watanabe, Discriminative Stimulus Properties of Ephedra Herb (Ephedra 
Sinica) in Rats, 13 YAKUBUTSU SEISHIN KODO 33, 33-38 (1993); C. R. Lake 
& R. S. Quirk, CNS stimulants and the Look-Alike Drugs, 7 PSYCHIATRY 
CIN. NORTH AMERICAN 689, 689-701 (1984). 
154 FAUSTMAN & OMENN, supra note 150, at 83-104; J. ASHBY & R.W. 
TENNANT, Chemical Structure, Salmonella Mutagenicity and Extent of 
Carcinogenicity as Indicators of Genotoxic Carcinogenesis Among 222 
Chemicals Tested in Rodents By The U.S. NCI/NTP, 204 MUTATION 
RESEARCH 17, 17-115 (1988). 
155 As occurred in Allen v. Penn. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th 
Cir. 1996). 
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cases, given the tort law standard of proof. Chemical structure-
biological activity data is ordinarily scientifically relevant 
evidence that can assist toxicity judgments.156 Whether it is or 
not will depend upon the particular evidence in question—it 
should not be dismissed because it is a particular kind or 
category of evidence. In addition, sometimes such evidence can 
contribute substantial evidence of causation for some classes of 
substances, as it could have in Allen v. Pennsylvania 
Engineering.157 In any case, such data should be part of 
scientifically reasonable patterns of evidence of causation, if it is 
relevant. How much scientific weight, probative value, or 
evidentiary strength molecular data has for a scientific argument 
in individual cases will depend on the substance, its properties, 
adverse effects, and other evidence that is available. Following 
the Daubert mandate, if the courts are to make the law better 
comport with the pertinent science in a case, they must 
recognize the scientific relevance and sometimes quite strong 
evidentiary weight of structure-activity relationships and other 
molecular properties. 
The structure-activity evidence for ethylene oxide (ETO) in 
Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering was especially powerful 
evidence of its particular toxicity. ETO is a multisite mutagen 
(that is, it causes DNA mutations in many tissues), a quite 
significant biological feature of a substance.158 Moreover, 
because it is a small molecule that requires no metabolic 
                                                          
156 CRANOR, supra note 45, at 111-12; IARC, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, Preamble to MONOGRAPH SERIES, Section 4 (a description is 
provided of any structure-activity relationships that may be relevant to an 
evaluation of the carcinogenicity of an agent, the toxicological implications of 
the physical and chemical properties, and any other data relevant to the 
evaluation that are not included elsewhere.). 
157 See discussion and accompanying text infra notes 200-01. 
158 “Mutagenicity testing, combined with an evaluation of chemical 
structure, has been found to identify a large proportion of trans-species, 
multiple-site carcinogens,” R. JULIAN PRESTON & GEORGE R. HOFFMANN, 
Genetic Toxicology, in CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 342 (Curtis D. 
Klassen et al. eds., 6th ed. 2001). 
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transformation to produce toxic effects (it is “direct-acting”),159 
it could reach nearly any target site in the body. The rat studies 
utilized in Allen noted above showed it could cross the blood-
brain barrier and reach the brain.160 Contrary to the view of the 
court, the ETO molecular evidence provided particularly 
powerful evidence of ETO’s toxicity.161 
3. Case Reports 
Case studies or case reports typically “arise from a 
suspicion, based on clinical experience, that the concurrence of 
two events—that is, a particular exposure and occurrence of a 
cancer—has  happened rather more frequently than would be 
expected by chance.”162 Case reports for vaccines and drugs are 
part of what health professionals call “passive reporting schemes 
that rely on the vigilance of health care providers to detect 
events that are felt to be due to the administration of a drug 
product.”163 They also are one of five major kinds of evidence 
                                                          
159 “Direct-acting carcinogens are typically carcinogenic at multiple sites 
and in all species examined. A number of the direct-acting alkylating agents, 
including some used in chemotherapy, are carcinogenic for humans.” (Vainio 
et al., 1991). HENRY C. PITOT III AND YVONENE P. DRAGAN, Chemical 
Carcinogenesis, in CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 681, 686 (Curtis 
D. Klassen et al. eds., 6th ed. 2001). 
160 This was plaintiffs’ experts’ argument, reported in CRANOR, supra 
note 45, at 324-28. 
161 This issue is described in greater detail in CRANOR, supra note 45, at 
324-28. Moreover, as part of NSF Grant #99-10952, David Eastmond and I 
had the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts reports in Allen v. Pennsylvania 
Engineering reviewed by two extramural experts, who judged that plaintiffs’ 
arguments that ETO could cause brain cancer in humans (based largely on the 
animal studies and information about the molecular properties of ETO) were 
within a range where scientists could reasonably disagree (and in fact offered 
the kinds of arguments that consensus scientific committees typically hear 
about carcinogens). 
162 IARC, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preamble to MONOGRAPH 
SERIES, Section 8. 
163 J. P. Collet et al., Monitoring Signals for Vaccine Safety: The 
Assessment of Individual Adverse Event Reports by an Expert Advisory 
Committee, 78 pt. 2 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG 178 (2000). 
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utilized in occupational settings to identify toxicants.164 
Case studies function best to reveal adverse causal reactions 
to vaccines, drugs, poisons, some anesthetics, and even dietary 
supplements.165 Their evidentiary value tends to increase when 
there is a fairly short interval between exposure and reaction and 
where adverse reactions are reasonably easily identified.166 
However, they have also been used to identify adverse reactions 
from occupational exposures (recall the discussion of vinyl 
chloride above).167 
Moreover, the Institute of Medicine Committee on the 
adverse effects from vaccines concluded that 
[I]n the absence of epidemiologic studies favoring 
acceptance of a causal relation, individual case 
reports and case series were relied upon, provided 
that the nature and timing of the adverse event 
following vaccine administration and the absence of 
likely alternative etiologic candidates were such that a 
reasonable certainty of causality could be 
inferred . . . from one or more case reports. The 
presence or absence of demonstrated biologic 
plausibility was also considered in weighing the 
overall balance of evidence for and against a causal 
relation.168 
To see how a case report can be especially good evidence, 
consider the following. A 42-year-old man developed Guillain-
Barré Syndrome (GBS), an acute inflammatory demyelinating 
polyneuritis following three independent tetanus shots over a 13-
year period. This disease “is characterized by the rapid onset of 
                                                          
164 Peter S. Thorne, Occupational Toxicology, in CASARETT AND 
DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 1131-32 (Curtis D. Klassen et al. eds., McGraw-Hill 
Med. Pub. Division 6th ed. 2001). 
165 DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 131-32. 
166 Id. 
167 The presentation on case studies is developed more fully in CRANOR, 
supra note 45, at Chapter 4. 
168 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CHILDHOOD VACCINES 31 (emphasis 
added). 
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flaccid motor weakness with depression of tendon reflexes and 
elevation of protein levels in CSF without pleocytosis. The 
annual incidence of GBS is about 1 per 100,000 for adults and 
approximately the same for children.”169 The Institute of 
Medicine judged that “because [this] case by Pollard and 
Selby . . . demonstrates that tetanus toxoid did cause GBS, in 
the [IOM] committee’s judgment tetanus toxoid can cause 
GBS.”170 It then added, “[t]he relation between tetanus toxoid 
and GBS is convincing at least for that one individual, even 
though this man [subsequent to his last episode of GBS caused 
by tetanus toxoid] experienced multiple recurrences of 
demyelinating polyneuropathy, most following acute viral 
illness . . . . [Two other cases] are recorded in enough detail to 
be accepted as GBS.”171 
The IOM regarded this single case report as sufficiently 
powerful on its own to show the likelihood of causation resulting 
from exposure to the tetanus toxoid (tetanus toxoid was capable 
of causing GBS). Moreover, the IOM judged the likelihood of 
general causation from the specific causation in this case.172 
Finally, they had little other data regarding adverse effects of 
tetanus toxid other than some background knowledge that 
foreign proteins introduced by vaccines can cause various 
adverse immune system reactions and the specific facts of the 
case. In particular, they had no epidemiological studies and no 
animal studies that reinforced this inference.173 
The Article I Special Masters in the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program (VICP), who assess whether persons 
have suffered compensable injuries from vaccines, “have 
debated the utility of case reports” for causation inferences.174 
                                                          
169 Id. at 86. 
170 Id. at 89 (emphasis in original). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. (“[B]ecause [this] case by Pollard and Selby (1978) demonstrates 
that tetanus toxoid did cause GBS, in the [IOM] committee’s judgment 
tetanus toxoid can cause GBS.”) (emphasis in original). 
173 Other case reports are discussed in CRANOR, supra note 45, at 
Chapter 4. 
174 Stevens v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 
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Some had initially opposed them, but, in the end, even a judge 
who was at first skeptical about them: 
concluded that a single persuasive case report and a 
petitioner whose symptoms matched the case report’s 
facts adequately supported petitioner’s actual 
causation claim for a tetanus toxoid cased GBS . . . 
Later, . . . [the same special master] opined that a 
single case report may support the possibility that a 
vaccine can cause a certain injury, “[i]f sound 
medical and scientific principles have been applied in 
that one case and the matter has been published for 
peer review.”175 
The case report that the judge found persuasive is the tetanus 
toxoid case study cited by the Institute of Medicine in the 
preceding paragraph.176 
Not all case reports will be such powerful evidence as the 
one mentioned or as strong as the case reports that assisted in 
the identification of the vinyl chloride monomer as a human 
carcinogen.177 Some may be poor reports that should not be 
considered scientifically relevant. However, courts should 
recognize that many case reports can be scientifically relevant 
and can serve as part of the evidentiary basis of a good scientific 
argument.178 They would need to assess each one for scientific 
relevance and not dismiss them because they are a kind of 
evidence that does not unerringly point to toxicity. 
                                                          
2001 WL 387418, at *14 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001) (quoting O’Leary v. 
Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 90–1729V, 1997 WL 
254217, at *3 (Apr. 4, 1997)). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at *15 n. 31. 
177 See supra notes at 12-13 and accompanying text for further 
discussion 
178 Some of the evidentiary value of case reports are discussed in more 
detail in CRANOR, supra note 45, at Chapters 4 and 6. 
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C.  Scientists Assess All the Relevant Scientific Evidence for 
a Conclusion 
Central to nondeductive (scientific) arguments is a need to 
integrate all the relevant and available evidence to come to a 
conclusion about the most likely explanation of what is 
occurring. In assessing a substance’s toxicity, scientists typically 
utilize human evidence, if it is available, experimental animal 
studies, if they are available, any chemical structure-biological 
activity evidence, and any mechanistic evidence in order to 
evaluate what conclusion follows.179 A widely shared view in 
setting out and assessing scientific arguments is, “never throw 
[relevant] evidence away.”180 
Recall from above that the International Agency for Research 
on Cancer scientific committees explicitly go through a stepwise 
process to integrate human and animal evidence together with 
mechanistic and other evidence to assess whether a substance is 
a carcinogen.181 Recommendations for integrating evidence are 
not unusual; quite the contrary, they are routine.182 For a more 
theoretical example of how all relevant evidence must be 
considered, consider Susan Haack’s description of Watson’s and 
Crick’s evidence for the double-helix structure of DNA: 
Chargaff’s discovery that there are approximate 
regularities in the relative proportions of adenine and 
thymine, guanine[,] and cytosine in DNA is hardly, 
by itself, strong evidence that DNA is a double-
helical, backbone-out macromolecule with like-with-
unlike base pairs; Franklin’s X-ray photographs of 
the B form of DNA are hardly, by themselves, strong 
                                                          
179 This is shown by many examples from the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer or similar examples from the national Toxicology 
Program. See CRANOR, supra note 45, at 302-19. 
180 Hutchinson & Lane, supra note 48, at 10. 
181 See supra note 59 for a further discussion concerning IARC. 
182 See, e.g., Cogliano, et. al, supra note 59 for a description of the 
process at IARC. Examples from the National Toxicology Program indicate a 
similar integration of evidence occurs in their deliberations. 
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evidence that DNA is a double-helical, backbone-out 
macro-molecule with like-with-unlike base pair. That 
the tetranucleotide hypothesis is false is hardly, by 
itself, strong evidence that DNA is a double-helical, 
backbone-out macromolecule with like-with-unlike 
base pairs, and so on. But put all these pieces of 
evidence together, and the double-helical, backbone-
out, like-with-unlike base pairs, structure of DNA is 
very well warranted (in fact, the only entry that 
fits).183 
This esoteric theoretical discovery, based on the integration 
of several different kinds of evidence, is likely much more 
difficult than inferring whether an exposure to a substance has 
made a causal contribution to disease. Yet, it points to the 
necessity for scientists, whether in the courtroom or laboratory, 
to assimilate in a scientifically plausible way all the relevant 
evidence to explain the claims in question. As noted above, 
eliminating each piece of evidence one by one would undermine 
this major scientific argument.184 
Moreover, different patterns or kinds of evidence may play a 
greater or lesser role in supporting a toxicity judgment, 
depending upon what other evidence may be available in a 
particular case.185 Sometimes one kind of evidence may be more 
important, sometimes another. Animal, in vitro, and various 
forms of mechanistic evidence, including structure-activity 
relationships, can be particularly important, depending upon the 
presence of other evidence.186 Other kinds of evidence have 
become increasingly important for assessing the toxicity of 
substances when there is poor or no human evidence. This has 
led some distinguished cancer researchers to point out that 
“there should be no [hierarchy of state-of-the-art approaches for 
making toxicity decisions]. Epidemiology, animal, tissue culture 
                                                          
183 See Haack, supra note 126, at 237 (2001). 
184 See supra discussion at notes 122-26. 
185 For examples see CRANOR, supra note 45, at 302-19. 
186 For some examples of this point see Cranor & Eastmond, supra note 
124, at 36-41; CRANOR, supra note 45, at 302-19. 
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and molecular pathology should be seen as integrating evidences 
in the determination of human carcinogenicity.”187 The Institute 
of Medicine and the National Research Council echo this 
point.188 
The mere fact that one piece of evidence does not strongly 
support a conclusion does not imply that all the evidence taken 
together fails to support it. In other words, a particular piece of 
evidence might fall short of ideal evidence of its kind, or even 
of ideal evidence for supporting the conclusion at issue, but the 
total evidence may still support the conclusion as more likely 
than not correct.189 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS 
How should courts approach scientific arguments, given the 
framework discussed above? The nature of scientific  arguments 
(inferences to the best explanation) and their features suggest the 
following procedure for reviewing expert testimony independent 
                                                          
187 Michele Carbone, George Klein, Jack Gruber & May Wong, Modern 
Criteria to Establish Human Cancer Etiology, 64 CANCER RESEARCH 5518, 
5522 (2004). 
188 DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 254 (“It is also not 
appropriate to develop a hierarchical approach to considering the different 
types of data—human data, animal data, in vitro data, or information about 
related substances—for various reasons. In part, such an approach is not 
feasible because of limitations in the quality of the data and what  different 
types of studies can reveal, but these limitations can be overcome with other 
types of data. Although a hierarchical approach is not practical, it is possible 
to weigh the various types of data available to make conclusions regarding 
risk to human health.”). 
189 DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 255 (“Individual pieces 
of information from any one of the categories of information (human, in 
vitro, animal, or related substances data) may sometimes be sufficiently 
compelling to both exceed a threshold of concern and to justify focused 
evaluation or action. In many circumstances, however, data will need to be 
collated within the same category or across several categories to determine 
the appropriate level of concern. That is, even if concern raised by one 
category of data—for example, human data—does not meet a threshold for 
action, the body of evidence available across several categories may raise the 
level of concern.”). 
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of legal language with which courts will be more familiar. 
Courts could inquire into the scientific relevance of 
individual pieces of evidence, but only if the evidence appears 
obviously irrelevant. Perhaps better, if courts are concerned 
about the scientific relevance of individual pieces of evidence, 
they might query how particular pieces could, however slightly, 
affect a particular scientist’s conclusion. Such a relevance review 
would not ordinarily result in rejection of evidence, since 
relevance criteria are comparatively easy to satisfy. An 
intellectual presumption might be that evidence is scientifically 
relevant, unless a judge finds a scientist cannot explain the 
relevance of particular evidence. 
Moreover, given the paucity of understanding of the toxicity 
of substances, courts need to recognize the obvious potential 
relevance of molecular evidence, animal studies, and good case 
reports. These are all kinds of studies with which some have 
struggled when they assumed individual pieces of evidence had 
to support by themselves, or perhaps provide major support for, 
an expert’s conclusions. 
Once courts are satisfied that no individual pieces of 
evidence are irrelevant, or they have excluded any that are 
obviously irrelevant, they could then review proposed testimony 
to determine whether the testimony or the argument, based on 
all the scientifically relevant and integrated evidence that the 
expert had used, is minimally legally plausible for the claims in 
question. They should ask: how plausible (or well supported) is 
the argument, given all the integrated evidence utilized by the 
expert? This is how one would think about nondeductive 
arguments outside the context of the law. Finally, in reviewing 
all the evidence considered together, courts might well find that 
experts can legitimately disagree about the weight or strength 
that each piece of evidence has for the overall argument. Courts 
must recognize the fact of scientific disagreement and allow for 
it in reviewing expert testimony.190 
What do these recommendations mean in terms of legal 
guidance with which courts would be familiar? According to the 
                                                          
190 CRANOR, supra note 45, at Chapter 7 (esp. 289-96). 
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Amended Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 the test for 
reviewing expert testimony is whether: 
(1) the testimony [which I take to be scientific 
argument] is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony [scientific argument] is the product 
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.191 
The logic of Rule 702 can be read as compatible with the 
ways in which scientists would assess other scientists’ 
arguments. Consider only the first two clauses. A plausible 
reading of clause (1) appears to suggest that courts address the 
following question: considering all the scientifically relevant 
evidence a scientist has taken into account, is his or her 
testimony (which can be the expert’s nondeductive argument for 
general or specific causation) supported by sufficient evidence 
for the conclusion he or she draws in order for a jury to 
consider it? That is, this section in order to make it compatible 
with assessing nondeductive arguments could be read to suggest 
that courts should review whether an expert’s scientifically 
relevant evidence taken as a whole is sufficiently strong for the 
conclusion for which an expert argues and sufficiently strong to 
pass a reliability review to assist a jury. There is no suggestion 
that individual items of evidence be rejected piecemeal as 
insufficiently supportive of the overall scientific conclusion. 
Perhaps this could be one interpretation of the clause, but it 
would be incompatible with scientific approaches to argument 
evaluation. 
Clause (2) requires that an expert’s testimony must be based 
upon “reliable principles and methods.”192 An inference to the 
best explanation is a standard inferential methodology that 
scientists and many other experts utilize to infer causation and 
other empirical claims. The methodology is widely endorsed and 
                                                          
191 Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, “Proposed Amendment: 
Rule 702” (December 2000) (emphasis in original). 
192 Id. 
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accepted.193 Particular scientific arguments, or uses of the 
method, are as “good” or “reliable” as an expert constructs 
them. How strong is the relation between all the relevant 
evidence in the premises and the conclusion drawn? In the terms 
of this article, the question would be, “Is the inference based on 
all the relevant evidence sufficiently plausible to assist a jury?” 
This suggests the following question for the courts: “Is a 
litigant’s expert’s argument, taking into account all the 
scientifically relevant evidence, sufficiently minimally plausible 
(reliable) for the expert to be admitted to testify?” Alternatively 
is the relationship between the premises and the conclusion so 
speculative, given all the scientifically relevant evidence that the 
expert should not be permitted to testify? 
Courts are likely to see mixed patterns of evidence with 
some possibly good case reports, likely some quite good animal 
data, molecular data, but at least sometimes with no definitive 
epidemiological studies. Because of scientific ignorance about 
the universe of chemical substances, poor testing of products by 
firms194 and perhaps reduced incentives for others to test them, 
toxicity data is likely to be limited,195 forcing experts to utilize 
arguments based upon a wide variety of scientifically relevant 
evidence. Thus, judges will need to recognize that scientists 
often must draw on more complex evidentiary patterns out of 
necessity, recognize that they can be quite good, and be 
prepared to admit testimony based on them even when there is 
poor or no epidemiological evidence. 
The Supreme Court in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael provided 
two valuable heuristics for reviewing scientific testimony for 
admissibility.196 The first is that the court should ensure “that an 
                                                          
193 See supra Section II. 
194 See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes 
Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 
2135 (1997) (citing studies of Agent Orange, asbestos, Bendectin, breast 
implants, the Dalkon Shield, thalidomide, tobacco, MER/29 (a cholesterol-
reducing drug that caused cataracts), alachlor, atrazine, formaldehyde, and 
perchloroethylene); CRANOR, supra note 45, at 166-70, 350-53, 364. 
195 See discussion and accompanying text supra notes 1-3. 
196 Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
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expert . . ., employs in the courtroom the same level of 
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in 
the relevant field.”197 This heuristic appears to be amplified on 
the following page where it is applied to the facts of the case. It 
added that a court may exclude evidence if it finds that an 
expert’s testimony falls “outside the range where experts might 
reasonably differ, and where the jury must decide among the 
conflicting views of different experts, even though the evidence 
is ‘shaky.’”198 Both heuristics are something of sociological 
guidelines for judges: How does this expert’s testimony on the 
issue in question compare to the standards of the profession (the 
first) or to other experts in the field (the second). 
The second heuristic is especially attractive and some judges 
have found it quite practical. Judge Lee utilized it in a Parlodel 
case,199 and Judge Pointer used it in the Silicone Breast Implant 
Litigation.200 Given the nature of scientific arguments, this can 
be quite a helpful guide, as I have argued elsewhere.201 
It follows from the second heuristic that if an expert’s 
                                                          
197 Id. at 152-53. 
198 Id. at 153. 
199 Order of the Court, April 6, 2001, in Soldo v. Sandoz 
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003). Judge Lee 
requested that if the appointed experts, disagreed with plaintiffs’ experts that 
Parlodel can and did cause stroke, address whether “opinions [should] be 
considered subject to sufficient genuine dispute as would permit other 
persons, generally qualified in your field of expertise, to express opinions 
that, though contrary to yours, would likely be viewed by others in the field 
as presenting legitimate and responsible disagreement within your 
professions?” Court’s Instructions to Experts appointed Pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 706. 
200 Judge Pointer utilized this heuristic to guide the deliberations of a 
Rule 706 National Academy of Sciences Panel, which was instructed to 
“review and critique the scientific literature pertaining to the possibility of a 
causal association between silicone breast implants and connective tissue 
diseases, related signs and symptoms, and immune system dysfunction.” 
Judge Pointer was the coordinating judge for the federal breast implant multi-
district litigation. The Panel published a report, dated November 17, 1998, 
which is entitled Silicone Breast Implants in Relation to Connective Tissue 
Diseases and Immunologic Dysfunction. 
201 CRANOR, supra note 45, at Chapter 7. 
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testimony is within the range of opinion where experts might 
reasonably differ on a scientific issue before a court even though 
the evidence is shaky, then he or she should be admitted to 
testify. Testimony that is within such a zone of reasonable 
scientific disagreement seems precisely the kind of testimony 
courts should permit juries to hear on disputed issues.202 
In toxic tort cases, there are usually at least two, and 
possibly more conclusions that litigants may claim are supported 
by the totality of the evidence. Plaintiffs typically claim that 
exposure to defendants’ substance caused or contributed to 
plaintiffs’ injuries, whereas defendants will claim that something 
else, such as other exposures, bad luck, genetic predisposition, 
unknown antecedents, etc., caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, one 
large factual issue for a jury is the comparison of two or more 
explanations: Is the plaintiff’s explanation more probable than 
the defendant’s? A judge’s task would seem to be to determine 
whether each side’s scientific testimony is sufficiently plausible, 
or “within the range of opinion where experts might reasonable 
differ,” given the relevant evidence on the issue, for a jury to 
hear the testimony.203 The jury must then assess the weight and 
credibility of the scientific evidence together with other evidence 
to decide the case.204 
CONCLUSION 
A central virtue of the law is fairness between litigants at the 
bar. It should be especially committed to fairness in 
admissibility decisions because such decisions can be so critical 
and outcome determinative. With the change in principles 
guiding admissibility from Frye to Daubert courts can no longer 
rely on generic admissibility reviews that were more typical 
under Frye. Instead, they will need to review individual 
                                                          
202 Of course such testimony should reliably apply to the facts of the 
case, as Daubert and the Amended Rule 702 require. 
203 Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
204 A more extensive discussion of these issues is in CRANOR, supra note 
45, at Chapter 7. 
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scientific arguments by experts and some of the individual 
evidence on which they rest for relevance. This is a difficult 
task, much more burdensome than under Frye, and something 
that challenges those distant from the science. If expert 
testimony is within the range of opinion where experts might 
reasonably differ on a scientific issue, the expert should be 
admitted to testify before a jury. If not, the expert should be 
excluded. Admitting testimony that is with a zone where 
comparable experts might reasonably differ would be part of fair 
admissibility reviews. 
The upshot of this proposal is that any assessments of 
plausibility or reliability (or whether the expert’s argument has 
the same intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of other 
experts in the relevant field or is within a zone of reasonable 
disagreement) should be applied to overall scientific arguments, 
not typically to individual pieces of evidence. This is not likely 
to make courts’ tasks easier; quite the contrary, such judgments 
will be more complicated than assessments some courts have 
made about individual pieces of evidence (but such reviews 
frequently were mistaken ways to evaluate scientific arguments, 
unless they focused merely on issues of relevance). Moreover, 
given how little is often known about potential toxicants, courts 
may face complex patterns of evidence that increase their 
challenges. Even though this is a much more daunting procedure 
to implement, it is the way scientists would review analogous 
arguments in their field. Fairness to an expert’s testimony would 
seem to require that courts review it as scientists would. If 
courts are going to review particular scientific arguments 
(testimony) as Daubert mandated, they will need to face up to 
the challenges of the task or perhaps return to a less intrusive, 
more generic guide for reviewing expert testimony.205 
 
                                                          
205 For an alternative to Daubert for reviewing expert testimony, see 
Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service, 199 Ill.2d 63 (2002). Other 
state courts have not followed the Daubert approach. See supra note 98. See 
also Raphael Metzger, The Demise Of Daubert In State Courts, Commentary 
for Lexis Nexis MEALEY’S Emerging Toxic Torts 14 (5) (June 3, 2005); 
available at http://www.mealeys.com. 
